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I. INTRODUCTION
Of late, a number of our best legal thinkers have devoted
much effort to developing principled theories about judicial re-
view.' "Theory" here refers to normative, and not merely descrip-
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University School of
Law-Indianapolis. The author extends his thanks for her assistance and counsel
to Rachel Anne Scherer.
1. To cite merely a few contemporary leaders in this regard, see, for
example, JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS (1980); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT (2001); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG
(AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006); RICHARD D. PARKER,
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tive, theories. That is, the reference is to theories of how legal
practices should be and not merely to how they are.' The debate
over judicial review includes theories that reject,3 as well as those
that endorse,4 or are indifferent or mixed5 in evaluating judicial
review. There are also a wide range of possible forms of judicial
review, with varying scopes and strengths.6
"HERE THE PEOPLE RULE:" A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994);
JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005); Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED
CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF CONST1TUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2001); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS (1999); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1991) [hereinaf-
ter WALDRON, Law and Disagreement]; KEITH E. WHIITTINGTON, POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2007). Among the vast law review
literature of relevance, see, for example, Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer,
On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1359 (1997);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Faith?: America Without Judicial Review, 98
MICH. L. REv. 1416 (2000); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutional-
ism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1027 (2004);
Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346 (2006) [hereinafter Waldron, Judicial Review].
2. Specifically, this refers to trying to determine what the Framers might
have intended with respect to judicial review.
3. Among various possible examples, consider TUSHNET, supra note 1.
4. Among similarly varied possible examples, see SEIDMAN, supra
note 1.
5. For something of a mixed or multi-level theory of judicial review,
see, for example, CHOPER, supra note 1. However, even theories that are typi-
cally thought of as opposing judicial review, perhaps on democratic grounds,
actually build in crucial limits, qualifications, and stipulations. See, e.g., Wal-
dron, Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 1352 (noting that "[it may still be the
case that judicial review is necessary as a protective measure against legislative
pathologies relating to sex, race, or religion in particular countries"). Crucially,
Professor Waldron's case against judicial review presumes "a commitment on
the part of most members of the society and most of its officials to the idea of
individual and minority rights," whatever persisting disagreements may remain
about the content of such rights. See Waldron, Judicial Review, supra note 1, at
1360. Even Professor Tushnet displays a real ambivalence among forms of
judicial review or their absence. See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 174.
6. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Is Capital Punishment Unconstitutional?
And Even if We Think It is, Should We Want the Supreme Court to so Rule?, 41
GA. L. REv. 867, 869 (2007) (noting that "the judicial power to protect constitu-
tionally entrenched human rights should be the power of judicial 'penultimacy,'
not the power of judicial 'ultimacy,' it should be the power to have, not the last
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Despite the prominence of such theories, this article will
argue that all such theories are practically misguided. The game
they allow people to play is not worth the candle thereby con-
sumed. Briefly put, the rough idea is that once one controls for
other relevant variables, the form of judicial review itself, if any,
only minimally affects the overall moral value of the constitutional
system. Thus, this article will not argue for or against any princi-
pled normative theory of judicial review on the merits. Instead, it
will argue that the effort devoted to working out principled norma-
tive theories of judicial review would be more beneficial if devoted
elsewhere. Considerations that can be separated from one's own
principled normative theory of judicial review are normally judged
far more morally weighty and rightly so.
These are complicated matters, but the basic idea is that
one can start to consider the moral weight that many theorists ordi-
narily attach, rightly so, to a particular view, to particular constitu-
tional outcomes, or to rules they deem to be crucial. These consti-
tutional outcomes may or may not have resulted from the Supreme
Court's exercise of judicial review. Any given theorist may evalu-
ate the constitutional outcomes in strongly negative or strongly
positive terms. In the most principled way, it is the most substan-
tively morally and politically important constitutional outcomes, as
judged by each theorist, that matters much more than whether the
theorist arrived at them by means of some form of judicial review
or not. Moral substance in constitutional law is thus largely inde-
pendent of and typically outweighs the moral value, positive or
negative, assumed to attach to some form of judicial review or its
absence.
Of course, one cannot work through this argument in the
introductory section. As will be discussed, a counterargument
claims that some form of judicial review, or its absence, deeply
matters. Some might claim that such a process embodies, on some
theory, great positive or negative moral value. Alternatively, in
what is already a sort of "weakened" claim or fall-back position,
some might claim that such a process is not merely correlative to
strongly favored constitutional outcomes but is realistically neces-
sary to achieve such outcomes. Yet, one can address such perspec-
tive only briefly below.
word, but only the penultimate word: for example, a word that may be over-
ruled by ordinary legislation").
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As the argument and in particular the counterarguments un-
fold, this discussion will move beyond example and counter-
example into the realm of contingency and sheer speculation. Yet,
not all speculation is equally plausible. All told, this article will
show good grounds for presuming that the popular practice of
crafting principled normative theories about judicial review is
largely a distraction.7
Concretely put, there are contemporary' and classic9 de-
fenses of some form of judicial review. However, judicial review
is now'° and has long been" contested and controversial. Referring
to judicial review, Dean Harry Wellington observed that "[a]lmost
every important case that displeases some sizable group leads to
questions about the legitimacy of the ... doctrine ... ,,2 More
recently, theorists have made related observations. Thus, Professor
Dale Carpenter suggests that "a growing number of respected con-
stitutional theorists, coming from a broad range of political and
jurisprudential perspectives, have begun to question the legitimacy
of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation."' 3  Even
more strongly, Professor Suzanna Sherry has asserted that
"[p]opular unhappiness with particular decisions . . . has turned
7. It should be noted here that this discussion brushes past, but does not
thereby commit self-contradiction, the claim that normative, principled theories
of judicial review are a distraction. The discussion need not and does not herein
defend or reject any theory of judicial review on the normative merits, and there-
fore, does not offer a normative theory of judicial review, distracting or other-
wise. This is the least distracting approach to judicial review. For examples,
see discussion infra Part IV.
8. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 70 (1985);
SEIDMAN, supra note 1; Alexander & Schauer, supra note I; Chemerinsky, su-
pra note 1.
9. See, e.g., the sources cited infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 1; Waldron, Judicial Review, supra
note 1, at 1346.
11. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A
STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW As AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 1
(Peter Smith Pub. Inc. 1957) (1938).
12. Harry H. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J.
486, 486 (1982) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
13. Dale Carpenter, Judicial Supremacy and Its Discontents, 20 CONST.
COMMENT. 405, 406-07 (2003). Theorists often draw a distinction between
"judicial supremacy" and the broader or weaker idea of "judicial review." See
infra Part III.
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into something deeper: a rejection of judicial review itself and a
belief that judges should bow to the wishes of the popular major-
ity.,,14 More moderately, scholars have raised the idea of somehow
balancing or drawing upon both popular, or democratic constitu-
tionalism and judicial supremacy."
Given the variety of possible approaches to judicial review,
it is overwhelmingly tempting to try to choose among the possibili-
ties based on the principled merits. One would "seek to transcend
[one's] own immediate policy preferences"' 16 on the underlying
substantive legal issues involved in all cases or in any given case.
One would then address questions of "the legitimacy of judicial
review, its function and character in cases of constitutional law,
and its harmony with democratic principles of government." 17
The main thesis of this article, however, is that one should
resist such apparent high-mindedness. The substantive merits of
the underlying constitutional cases-past, present, or future-
however one perceives them, instead tend to hold the attention, as
should rightly be the case. Forms of judicial review, or their ab-
sence, in and of themselves, are usually of minimal independent
normative value. People may care much more about judicial re-
view in the future than about judicial review in the past, but no one
is sure what the substantive moral and political effects of judicial
review will be over the next quarter century. Even if people were
to care more about judicial review in the future, this would hardly
give a person a reason to like or dislike judicial review, on princi-
ple, independent of one's view of the merits of the particular moral
and political effects of judicial review over the specified period of
time.
To develop this thesis, this article will first briefly refer to
some of the landmark United States Supreme Court cases on judi-
cial review, with the barest indication of historical and contempo-
14. Suzanna Sherry, Democracy and the Death of Knowledge, 75 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1053, 1053 (2007). Note here the possibly broader reference not merely
to judicial supremacy but to judicial review. See id.
15. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Depart-
mentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (2004) (con-
trasting the constitutional populism of Professor Larry Kramer).
16. LEONARD W. LEVY, Judicial Review, History, and Democracy: An
Introduction, in JuDicIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT: SELECTED ESSAYS
1, 1(1967).
17. Id.
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rary commentary." Next, this article will survey some representa-
tive forms and combinations of judicial review and judicial su-
premacy, and their absence, with reference to leading comparative
institutions.' 9 The argument then begins to unfold as this article
distinguishes a concern for judicial review from a concern for the
broadly moral or political substantive merits in a particular illustra-
tive context.20 This article will then expand the focus to highlight
what many adopters of most political perspectives would view as
the broadly mixed record of judicial review over the course of
American judicial history. Whether one generally favors or dis-
favors judicial review, almost any period of American judicial his-
tory offers grounds both generally and specifically to morally and
politically crucial issues for encouragement and for regret in a
sense of missed opportunity.
From there, this will consider some of the commonly
claimed, supposedly inherent, advantages of judicial review or its
absence. Thus, this article will survey the debates over claims of
23judicial independence from politics or other social influences,
with a look at some of the accumulating social science evidence; 24
the related idea of judicial review as distinctively allowing for de-
cision-making on the basis of principle;" minority rights underjudical • 26
judicial review; understandings of democracy under judicial re-. 27 2
view; and the question of the relationship between settlement,"
finality,29 destabilization,30 and judicial review. Finally, the Con-clusion sketches the debate in a somewhat broader context.'
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See infra Part V.
24. See infra Part V.
25. See infra Part V.
26. See infra Part V.
27. See infra Part V.
28. See infra Part V.
29. See infra Part V.
30. See infra Part VI.
31. See infra Part VII.
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II. SOME BASIC CASE LAW AND COMMENTARY ON JUDICIAL
REvIEw
References to the most famous authoritative statements on
judicial review can set the stage for reacting to the claims of judi-
cial review's defenders and critics. Certainly one such statement is
that of Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 78.32 Hamilton ar-
gues that what he refers to as "a limited constitution," with effec-
tive restrictions on the scope of congressional legislative power,
requires "the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all
acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. With-
out this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would
amount to nothing. 33
The celebrated case of Marbury v. Madison34 is the central
judicial text on judicial review, even though much of the argument
begs crucial questions regarding disputes among branches as to
what the Constitution requires.3 ' Thomas M. Cooley conveys a
sense of Marbury's question-begging by recognizing that "in de-
claring a law unconstitutional, a court must necessarily cover the
same ground which has already been covered by the legislative
department in deciding upon the propriety of enacting the
law ... ,36 It is not as though the legislature must merely adopt a
bill without assessing its constitutionality, so the view of the re-
viewing court on the statute's constitutionality need not therefore
be exclusive or uncontested.
Famously, though, Marbury declares that "[i]t is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 379 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terrence Ball
ed. 2003).
33. Id. This language should not be regarded as entirely settling the ques-
tion of whether the Framers intended judicial review, a question that "has often
been asked and often answered, though not with entire conclusiveness as to the
answering." EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 1 (Peter Smith
Pub. Inc. 1957) (1938).
34. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
35. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE UNITED
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 101, 107 (Walter Carrington 8th ed. 1927)
(1868).
36. Id. at 334.
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the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of
necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with
each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.",17 Af-
ter a gap of half a century,38 the Court again exercised the power of
judicial review, infamously, in the fugitive slave case, Dred Scott
v. Sandford.39  However, probably the best-known discussion of
judicial review after Dred Scott, the case of Cooper v. Aaron,4
bears a directly opposite substantive political valence and underly-
4'ing value message.
The Cooper Court cited Marbury for "the basic principle
that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of
the Constitution. 42  Yet, Cooper engaged in its own question-
begging, however, otherwise justified the end. Thus, Cooper de-
clared that "no state legislator or executive or judicial officer can
war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to
support it."'43 The Court offered little beyond Marbury and plati-
37. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. The Marbury Court, fully appreciating that
Congress, too, takes an oath to uphold the Constitution, seems here to rely more
on a "formalist" or a "naturalist" logic as distinct from a concern for well-
functioning power symmetry between branches or pragmatic balance of powers
concerns. Nor does the Court here much explain any supposed judicial advan-
tage over the legislature with respect to "facial" as distinct from "as-applied"
constitutional challenges. For examples of some of the relevant commentary on
Marbury, see Sanford Levinson, Why I Still Won't Teach Marbury (Except in a
Seminar), 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 588 (2004); Robert F. Nagel, Marbury v. Madi-
son and Modern Judicial Review, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 613 (2003); Wil-
liam Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1.
38. See JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE
OF AMERICAN CONSTTrUTIONAL LAW 3 (2005).
39. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). Professor Rubenfeld notes that after Dred Scott
and the Civil War, "[T]he justices were too busy cutting back on the rights and
powers created by the Fourteenth Amendment-that is, too busy vindicating old
constitutional understandings-to impose on the nation radically new ones."
RUBENFELD, supra note 38, at 4.
40. 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (per curiam) (noting that the state legislature and
governor are legally bound by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause in the public school desegregation context).
41. See id.
42. Id. at 18 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
43. Id.
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tude to support its apparent identification of the Constitution itself
with the meaning that the Court ultimately ascribed to it."
In a later case, Baker v. Carr,45 the Court declared, without
much elaboration, that deciding whether another federal branch has
exceeded "whatever authority has been committed, is itself a deli-
cate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility
of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution." 46 More
recently, the Court has reiterated that "the courts retain the power,
as they have since Marbury v. Madison, to determine if Congress
has exceeded its authority under the Constitution., 47 The Court's
defense of judicial review continues, however, to partake indirectly
of an unnecessarily question-begging approach. For example, the
Court argues that "[i]f Congress could define its own powers by
altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would
the Constitution be 'superior paramount law, unchangeable by or-
dinary means.' 48 This formulation seems to assume that for Con-
gress to disagree with a Supreme Court constitutional holding is
for Congress to "alter" the Constitution itself, or at least the Con-
stitution as most authoritatively interpreted.
More importantly, though, a parallel argument is apparent
with regard to the Court itself. Following the Court's own logic,
why could one not say, that if the Supreme Court could define its
44. See id. at 19 (asserting that the mandates of a state governor on a
constitutional issue were not merely contradicted by the conflicting constitu-
tional judgment of the Supreme Court but rather by the mandates of the Consti-
tution itself).
45. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
46. Id. at 211. For brief interpretations of Cooper v. Aaron and of Baker
v. Carr by a distinguished interpreter of other sorts of texts, see JAROSLAV
PELIKAN, INTERPRETING THE BIBLE AND THE CONSTITUTION 73 (2004). See also
id. at 74 (noting that "the continuing scholarly controversy about 'judicial re-
view' and its limits, especially during the twentieth century, has disclosed how
much ambiguity there still is, even after Marbury"). For further discussion, but
of a crucially question-begging nature, see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
548-49 & 548 n.86 (1969). The Powell Court notes that "federal courts on oc-
casion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction
given the document by another branch. The alleged conflict that such an adjudi-
cation may cause cannot justify the courts' avoiding their constitutional respon-
sibility." Id. at 549.
47. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
48. Id. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
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own powers by altering Article Il's meaning, the Constitution
would cease to be "superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordi-
nary means.. .,?49 Could the Supreme Court not possibly alter the
meaning of Article IH, and thus its own powers, even if it wanted
to? Are these cases of congressional and Supreme Court interpre-
tation of the Constitution perhaps really then parallel, at least as far
as the Court's own argument goes?
The leading Supreme Court opinions, cited above, give a
general idea of the Court's own understanding of the legitimate
scope of judicial review. Understandably, those opinions do not
give much of a sense of the broad range of possible forms of judi-
cial review or of the substantive arguments for and against judicial
review. For even a modest sense of some the possible alternatives,
one must turn to the theorists and to international practice.
III. SOME FORMS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
Judicial review comes in several varieties. For instance,
judicial review in a generic sense may include arrangements re-
ferred to as judicial supremacy. Judicial supremacy is, however,
sometimes distinguished from mere judicial review. The defini-
tions of both may vary at least slightly, and even the basic termi-
nology is not entirely uniform. For the purposes of this article,
however, neither precision nor exhaustiveness is essential.
For a sense of some of the possibilities, one may turn to a
classic treatise by the well-recognized theorist, Edward S.
Corwin. ° Corwin's work refers to three separate understandings of
the effect of Supreme Court pronouncements on a constitutional
question.5 Corwin's own words best express these ideas:
First, there is the theory that a pronouncement by
the Court of 'unconstitutionality' upon an act of
Congress merely settles the law of the case in con-
nection with which the pronouncement was made,
49. Id. (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177). For a discussion, see Robert F.
Nagel, Judicial Supremacy and the Settlement Function, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 849 (1998).
50. EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF
JUDIcIAL REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT (Peter Smith
Pub. Inc. 1957) (1938).
51. See id. at 2.
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and of such future cases as the Court may choose to
apply it on the strength of the doctrine of stare de-
cisis. Secondly, there is the theory that such a pro-
nouncement further operates, unless reversed, to
strike the condemned statute from the statute book.
Lastly, there is the view that such a pronouncement
also fixes the meaning of the Constitution against
the President and Congress unless either the Court
reverses itself on ground of 'error' or the Constitu-
tion is amended on the point involved.52
Corwin's first theory may be a nod toward some lesser degree of
Supreme Court control of constitutional meaning than does
Corwin's third theory. Even the third theory is open to a range of
readings, but it seems to suggest a strong form of judicial review or
some form of judicial supremacy.
Professor James Fleming has more recently offered a more
specific and carefully-delineated typology of approaches to popu-
lar rule and judicial review. 3 Professor Fleming's schema distin-
guishes five such approaches. These approaches, somewhat re-
formulated, consist of: (1) a populism, or popular self-government,
that rejects even the underlying constitutional limits on popular
self-government, let alone judicial enforcement of those constitu-
tional limits;4 (2) populism that accepts some constitutional limits,
but not judicial enforcement of those constitutional limits, on
popular rule; " (3) judicial review, but not judicial supremacy, in
the sense that constitutional authority is shared among the courts,
the executive and legislative branches-departmentalism-and
ultimately with the people-populism; 5 6 (4) departmentalism or the
sharing of constitutional interpretive authority among the judicial,
52. Id. at 2-3.
53. See James E. Fleming, Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy:
Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. REv.
1377, 1378-80 (2005).
54. See id. at 1378-79. For an example of the more minimalist end of the
judicial review spectrum, see RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE THE PEOPLE RULE":
A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994), in which the author reposed
little faith in even shared or departmentalized constitutional authority, let alone
general judicial supremacy in such matters.
55. See Fleming, supra note 53, at 1378-79.
56. See id.
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executive, and legislative branches that thereby rejects judicial su-
premacy but does not embrace populism;" and (5) endorsement of
judicial supremacy in some form, even if partly in response to
popular political movements. 8
All of Fleming's terms have somewhat different scope and
references. In general, the weakest forms of judicial review some-
how leave ultimate constitutional authority to other branches, with
the courts merely formally highlighting a constitutional problem or
even declaring a statute unconstitutional but subject to some form
of legislative override or reaffirmation.' 9 Departmentalism, as a
type of judicial review, is generally thought to come in two
forms.6° The first form entails each branch having a "defensive"
ultimate authority over the constitutionality of actions taken by
either of the other two branches and affecting that branch. 6' The
second form of departmentalism involves a broader right or man-
date of each branch to follow its own best constitutional judgment,
despite any contrary judgments expressed by another branch.62
Either form of departmentalist judicial review falls short of
judicial supremacy, in the sense of some sort of judicial monopoly,
when testing the power to authoritatively resolve conflicting inter-
pretations of the Constitution.63 Even the idea of judicial suprem-
acy can be further classified in several ways. For example, Profes-
sor Daniel Farber has further distinguished among levels of judi-
57. See id. For extended discussion of the departmentalism versus judi-
cial supremacy distinction, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 1-27 (2007). Pro-
fessor Whittington argues that judicial supremacy has been adopted in part be-
cause other political branches derive political benefit therefrom. Id. at 27; see
also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 173
(1999) (noting that "[p]olitical leaders often find judicial review a convenient
way to hand off hard decisions to someone else").
58. See Fleming, supra note 53, at 1379-80.
59. For a brief, informal treatment by a leading scholar, see Jeremy Wal-
dron, On Judicial Review: Laurence H. Tribe, Jeremy Waldron, and Mark
Tushnet Debate, DISSENT, Summer 2005, at 83, 85.
60. See Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH.
L. REv. 2781, 2781 (2003).
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See, e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION OF JUDICIAL
POWER 40 (1993).
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cial supremacy in ascending order of strength, what he terms: de-
cisional supremacy, anticipatory supremacy, and precedential su-
premacy.64 These notions refer, respectively, to judicial power to
issue orders binding on other branches in a constitutional case,65
judicial power to bind through precedent prior to the issuing of a
court order,66 and judicial power to bind through precedent even
when no binding court order is obtainable, as when a certain matter
is somehow unreviewable.67
One certainly might endorse some weaker form of judicial
review, while stopping short of endorsing one or more forms of
judicial supremacy. Walter Murphy, for example, defends depart-
mentalism in the following terms:
If a single institution could not only determine the
scope of its own authority, that of the other
branches of government, and the legitimacy of all
public policies, but also definitively define the very
essence of constitutional democracy, the polity
would be in danger. Vesting responsibility for con-
stitutional interpretation among several institutions
competing for power substantially lowers danger of
rule by a special interpretive elite, although it in-
creases the messiness of politics. 6
64. Daniel A. Farber, The Importance of Being Final, 20 CONST.
COMMENT. 359, 359 (2003).
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. For a more general typology of weaker and stronger systems
of partial judicial review, see Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Weak and Strong Judi-
cial Review, 22 L. & PHIL. 381 (2003). The author discusses "compound" sys-
tems which sometimes, but not always, allow a legislature's statutory override
of a contrary constitutional decision by a court. Id. at 384.
68. WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND
MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL ORDER 470-71 (2007); see also at least under
one possible interpretation, LEARNED HAND, The Contribution of an Independ-
ent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 118, 125 (Irving Dillard ed., 1959) (arguing that
in exchange for judicial independence, courts "should not have the last word in
those basic conflicts of 'right and wrong-between whose endless jar justice
resides"' (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TROILUS AND CRESSIDA act 1, sc. 3);
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Of course, departmentalism is not without its own theoretical diffi-
culties. Most obviously, departmentalism cannot itself establish
the proper boundaries between any two of the federal branches. In
the absence of some single final arbiter of such matters-whether
the Supreme Court or not-the proper bounds of departmental au-
thority must remain contestable and unresolved. What one branch
may perceive as an incursion by another branch may appear to that
other branch to be a legitimate exercise of its constitutionally-
designated authority.
These basic distinctions do not begin to exhaust the inter-
esting forms of judicial review and its absence. Among the best-
known further permutations is John Hart Ely's process-based judi-
cial review, a theory "that bounds judicial review under the Consti-
tution's open-ended provisions by insisting that it can appropri-
ately concern itself only with questions of participation, and not
with the substantive merits of the political choice under attack."'69
As a matter of comparative constitutional law, there is also a range
of international possibilities, including systems with no or vari-
ously limited judicial review.7°
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say
What the Law Is, 82 GEO. L.J. 217, 225 (1994) (endorsing departmentalism as
distinct from judicial supremacy); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The
Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHi. L. REV. 887, 890 (2003). (noting that
"[miuch of the recent attack on judicial review is really an effort to undermine
judicial supremacy")),
69. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 181 (1980). On such a theory, one is left to hope that viola-
tion of one's most intense substantive constitutional preferences will correlate
with some sufficiently severe defect in procedure or fair political representation.
For a classic response to Ely, see Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
70. For discussions of some leading approaches internationally, see, for
example, SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE
THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT)
124-25 (2006) (noting that "certainly there are some admirable countries, the
Netherlands for example, that have maintained a polity that is congruent with
the values of our Preamble without engaging in judicial review"); see also Wo-
jciech Sadurski, Judicial Review and the Protection of Constitutional Rights, 22
O.J.L.S 275 (2002) (considering some complications of the claim that some
countries with zero or limited non-rights-focused judicial review may often pro-
tect rights as well or better than countries with some more substantial form of
judicial review); Mark Tushnet, Democracy Versus Judicial Review: Is It Time
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There is certainly no consensus that any of the forms of ju-
dicial review or no judicial review at all better protects fundamen-
tal rights.7' More broadly, it is fair to raise the possibility that there
may not be any interesting correlations between any typically-held
set of basic substantive moral and political views on the one hand
and any particular system of judicial review or its absence on the
other. This discussion certainly need not adopt any such position.
There may be actual causal links, running in either direction, be-
tween systems of judicial review and substantive moral values.
Either an initial adoption of judicial review promotes adoption of
particular substantive values, or a commitment to particular sub-
stantive values leads one to tend to endorse or reject judicial re-
view.
In any case, one should not expect to see the judicial review
tail wagging the dog. Most of the recognized value or disvalue in
any system of judicial review will be in its perceived distinctive
substantive payoffs over a given time period. Even if a prior
choice of a system of judicial review always leads one to adopt
particular substantive moral and political values,72 those latter val-
ues will likely be crucial, and rightly so, in justifying the chosen
system of judicial review. Given serious conflicts between one's
approach to judicial review and one's basic moral and political
to Amend the Constitution?, DISSENT, Spring 2005, at 59, 60 (noting the absence
of generalized judicial review in the Netherlands, "a country not noted for wide-
spread violations of civil liberties" and the possibility of a legislative override of
a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality by two thirds or even by bare major-
ity vote); Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L.
REv. 2781, 2783-87 (2003) (contrasting in particular Germany, Canada, Britain,
and New Zealand on the possible forms of judicial review); Jeremy Waldron,
On Judicial Review: Laurence H. Tribe, Jeremy Waldron, and Mark Tushnet
Debate, DISSENT, Spring 2005, at 83, 85 (noting the nuanced possibilities of
limited judicial review in Britain and implicitly recognizing thereby the almost
infinite gradation of logical possibilities for judicial review generally).
71. See generally sources cited supra note 70.
72. That is, one need not regard theories of judicial review as what are
called mere epiphenomena. Adopting some such theory might affect one's sub-
stantive moral and political beliefs. In cases of conflict, one should expect the
latter basic or primary substantive beliefs to outweigh one's commitment to the
former. Also, theories of judicial review are and should be evaluated by a per-
son mainly in accordance with how well or poorly they promote his most basic
and otherwise best defended substantive moral and political value commitments.
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values, the latter will usually predominate.73 Many may be unwill-
ing to tolerate unnecessary loss of substantive moral and political
14values for the sake of preserving a given form of judicial review.
When one's approach to judicial review and one's substantive
moral and political values are more compatible, those substantive
values will typically be most important.
IV. THE QUESTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS A DISTRACTION:
AN EXAMPLE AND THE BROADER CONTEXT
The potential for distraction among theories of judicial re-
view is illustrated by an interesting and widely noted collection of
short papers by Rev. Richard John Neuhaus,75 Robert H. Bork,76
Russell Hittinger,77 Hadley Arkes, 8 Charles W. Colson,79 and
Robert P. George. ° The collection of papers clearly makes numer-
ous explicit references to matters of democracy, the separation of
powers, theories of constitutional interpretation, and most notably
to judicial review and judicial supremacy. Thus, there are declara-
tions, for example, of the existence of "an entrenched pattern of
government by judges that is nothing less than the usurpation of
73. This does not mean, however, that we should be quick to abandon our
approaches to judicial review if it appears that they will not pay off in substan-
tive value terms over some chosen time frame. The future may, in various re-
spects, not work out as we expect. Even past constitutional decisions may not
have the continuing consequences we expect. The unanticipated risks and costs
of any change in our system of judicial review may be dramatic. For general
background, see DAVID HUME, Essay Twenty-Three to Twenty-Six, in POLITICAL
ESSAYS 186-220 (Knud Haakonssen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1752).
74. We hold open the possibility that some may endorse or reject judicial
review based more on its past accomplishments, or its past perceived abuses,
over some salient period-perhaps the past generation-than on its predicted
effects over the next generation.
75. Rev. Richard John Neuhaus, Introduction to The End of Democracy?
The Judicial Usurpation of Politics, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1996, at 1.
76. Robert H. Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1996, at
21.
77. Russell Hittinger, A Crisis of Legitimacy, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1996,
at 25.
78. Hadley Arkes, A Culture Corrupted, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1996, at 30.
79. Charles W. Colson, Kingdoms in Conflict, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1996,
at 34.
80. Robert P. George, The Tyrant State, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1996, at 39.
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politics."'" Theorists often note that, "[a]gain and again, questions
that are properly political are legalized, and even speciously consti-
tutionalized. '' 12 There is a broader argument that "generations of
Americans have accorded all courts, and most especially the Su-
preme Court, unchecked power. '8 3 More dramatically, theorists
also contend that, "The Justices are our masters in a way that no
President, Congressman, governor, or other elected official is.
'4
In this sense, the focus of the papers in this collection is
clearly on allegations of judicial usurpation and judicial supremacy
and thus squarely on the broader notion of the proper scope of ju-
dicial review. Still, the idea of a genuine focus on judicial review
begins to fade when one notices that the authors' grievances ex-
pand into allegedly insufficient judicial respect for particular
methods of the judicial resolution of cases, even for methods of
interpreting the Constitution, such as originalism85 and textualism.1
6
While the idea of the Court's departing from methods of original-
ism and textualism could certainly be directly related to claims of
judicial usurpation, there is at least some distinction to be drawn
between methods by which the Court should interpret the Constitu-
tion and whether or how dramatically the Court should have the
last word, however arrived at, in constitutional matters.
A fair reading of the essays in this symposium suggests that
much of the real motivating force and the overriding concern lie
elsewhere, in matters of moral and political substance. Toward the
beginning of his essay, for example, Robert Bork focuses not on
usurpation, or process, but on substance. In just the preceding
Court term, Bork argues that
[t]he Court moved a long way toward making ho-
mosexual conduct a constitutional right, adopted the
radical feminist view that men and women are es-
sentially identical, continued to view the First
Amendment as a protection of self-gratification
rather than of the free articulation of ideas, and
81. See Neuhaus, supra note 75, at 1.
82. Id.
83. Bork, supra note 76, at 23.
84. Id.; see also Hittinger, supra note 77, at 26.
85. See Bork, supra note 76, at 22.
86. See Hittinger, supra note 77, at 27.
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overturned two hundred years of history to hold that
political patronage is unconstitutional. 7
In the context of contemporary law and politics, it is difficult to
believe that Professor Bork objects to the above outcomes only, or
even mostly, insofar as they are the product of an allegedly objec-
tionable process of judicial review. Even the purported judicial
overreach, combined with the distinct question of non-textual and
non-originalist methods of constitutional interpretation, hardly cap-
tures the nature and force of Professor Bork's concern. The
broader context suggests that Professor Bork and his fellow con-
tributors are more compellingly motivated by what they take to be
the substantive moral or legal wrongness of these and other legal
outcomes, however arrived at.
The focus of these authors' concerns is clearly on predict-
able substantive issues, centering around abortion, euthanasia, and
gay marriage or gay rights more generally.88 Cases raising these
issues will, as the authors recognize, affect other substantive values
of the law and culture as well.89 Yet, the crucial attention is really
on substantive normative concerns, 9° rather than on the proper
scope and limits of judicial review.
It is also important to appreciate that even the institutional
focus of these authors is not entirely on the courts.91 Even when
the courts are directly involved, the real concern, according to
these authors, is that "[t]he courts, sometimes abetted by, and al-
most always acquiesced in [by] federal and state executives and
legislators, have imposed upon the nation immoral policies that
pro-life Americans cannot, in conscience, accept." 92 In such cases,
it is ordinarily the substantive policies that are thought to be cru-
cially moral or immoral, and thus, the policies drive the political
and institutional arguments, as opposed to typically less pressing
issues of one form of judicial review over another.93 Despite the
87. Bork, supra note 76, at 21.
88. See, e.g., Arkes, supra note 78, at 31; Colson, supra note 79, at 37.
89. See Hittinger, supra note 77, at 28.
90. See, e.g., George, supra note 80, at 40 (referring to "people's funda-
mental rights").
91. See George, supra note 80, at 40, 44.
92. Id. at 44.
93. See id. at 40-44; Frank I. Michelman, Living with Judicial Suprem-
acy, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 579, 582-83 (2003).
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obvious surge of academic interest in judicial review and its possi-
ble abandonment, this should not surprise anyone.
This article does not suggest that it is unreasonable for peo-
ple interested in public policy to stake out some position for or
against some form of judicial review. At the same time, it is fair to
say that wherever a person stands on the political spectrum, it is
also reasonable to find the historical record of the Supreme Court
to be, from that political perspective, profoundly mixed. One can
examine historic Supreme Court decisions and find a broad range
of more or less progressive, liberal, or egalitarian results from
various historical periods.94 It is likewise plain that one can also
94. By way merely of example, consider: Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005) (making juvenile death penalty unconstitutional); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning anti-sodomy statute); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (considering affirmative action in law school
admissions); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (making death penalty for
low I.Q. defendants unconstitutional); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)
(outlining constitutionality of late term abortion procedures); Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (prohibiting student-chosen prayer at
game); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (outlining scope of Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997) (setting limits on shielding minors from speech on Internet); United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (banning sex discrimination in public
schooling); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (limiting religious invocation
at public school under the Establishment Clause); United States v. Eichman, 496
U.S. 310 (1990) (asserting flag burning speech rights despite congressional stat-
ute); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (considering flag burning); Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (limiting recovery for torts under free
speech); Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (barring
speech content-based sales tax); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (hold-
ing racial bias in peremptory challenges unconstitutional); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (outlining meaningful equal protec-
tion standard for mental disability); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U.S. 886 (1982) (limiting liability based on association with a group; limiting
liability to the members who actually caused the damage); Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982) (upholding educational rights of aliens); Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39 (1980) (addressing Ten Commandments classroom plaque); Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (limiting patronage); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978) (upholding right to marry); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705
(1977) (considering compelled speech); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)
(limiting patronage where it constrains freedoms of belief and association);
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (defining a constitutional limi-
tation on alien access to civil service work); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
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(1974) (allowing property tax exemption for widows); Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634 (1973) (exploring state civil service work for aliens); U.S. Dep't of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (barring federal benefit discrimination
against non-traditional families); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (creat-
ing a rigorous obscenity test); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (limiting state
restrictions on abortion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (considering
free exercise rights and education); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(allowing non-marital contraceptives); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (pro-
scribing arbitrary sex discrimination); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. ,365
(1971) (refining the eligibility for state welfare benefits and the constitutional
treatment of alienage); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (protecting"emotional" speech meaning); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (lift-
ing filing fee barrier to divorce); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (assert-
ing welfare due process rights); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (cre-
ating a speech-protective test for subversive advocacy); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (barring welfare discrimination against new state entrants);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (creating
student speech protection test); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (in-
corporating most of the Bill of Rights); Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co.,
391 U.S. 73 (1968) (protecting the rights of non-marital children); Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (fixing speech rights of public employees);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (protecting rights of non-marital chil-
dren); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (protecting right to interracial mar-
riage); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (instituting due process for juveniles);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (creating right to warning/explanation
of rights of arrestee); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(holding discriminatory state poll tax unconstitutional); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing right to use contraceptives); Aptheker v.
Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (proscribing overbroad limits on travel);
N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (setting free speech limits on libel
recovery); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (asserting right to ap-
pointed criminal counsel); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (limiting school
prayer under the Establishment Clause); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
(limiting state legislative reapportionment); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (expanding the definition of entanglement and state
action); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (upholding right to anonymous
speech); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (subjecting state officials to Su-
preme Court constitutional interpretation); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)
(stressing the importance of travel rights); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954) (requiring District of Columbia school desegregation); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (ordering state-level public school desegregation);
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1952) (holding that adult speech rights are
not limited to children's speech rights); Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952) (limiting President's war and executive powers); Ter-
miniello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (protecting provocative speech);
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find an equally broad range of significant cases of an opposite po-
litical valence, sometimes finding an obvious "paired" or counter-
part case, opposing each other across various periods of constitu-
tional history.95
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (broadening racial state action); W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (exploring public education
and the Pledge of Allegiance); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (fore-
shadowing privacy-oriented substantive due process cases); W. Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding state intervention in employment
markets); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (banning ethnic and racial
discrimination).
95. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S.
Ct. 2738 (2007) (finding de facto racial balances in schools not a compelling
government interest); Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (further limit-
ing Tinker speech rights); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (restricting
late-term abortion); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (limiting public
employee speech rights; academic speech rights left unaddressed); Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (compel-
ling university speech regarding military recruiting); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244 (2003) (holding affirmative action by university not narrowly tailored);
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (limiting suits by
disabled persons against state employer); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)
(deciding Bush-Gore Florida recount); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (holding gender violence statute outside Congress's commerce power);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (limiting enforcement of age
discrimination statute against states); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (find-
ing no fundamental right to assisted suicide); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702 (1997) (finding no fundamental right to assisted suicide); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (limiting congressional power to aggres-
sively enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (ordering strict scrutiny of all racial affirmative ac-
tion); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (limiting federally-funded abortion
information); Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189
(1989) (recognizing limited scope of non-custodial "positive" rights); Hazel-
wood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (limiting scope of Tinker
speech protection); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding minimum
scrutiny of prisoners' constitutional rights); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987) (noting racial disparities in death penalty); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding state prohibition of consensual sodomy); Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (setting restrictive limits on standing); Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (limiting speech fights of public'employees); Haig
v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (upholding passport revocation on national secu-
rity grounds); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (upholding preclear-
ance review for unclassified material in CIA agent's book); Ambach v. Nor-
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Thus, as much today as thirty years ago,
Every lawyer thinks that the Supreme Court has
gone wrong, even violently wrong, at some point in
its career. If he does not hate the conservative deci-
sions of the early 1930s, which threatened to block
the New Deal, he is likely to hate the liberal deci-
sions of the [1960s and 1970s].96
wick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding state limits on aliens as teachers); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (creating a near mirror-image of Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (denying
abortion subsidies); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (excluding preg-
nancy disability as not gender-based); Saxbe v. Washington Post, Co., 417 U.S.
843 (1974) (limiting rights of press and prisoners); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817 (1974) (limiting rights of press and prisoners); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding no federal constitutional right to
education; minimum scrutiny for wealth/poverty); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972) (considering death penalty); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)
(apparently denying constitutional minimal housing right); Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (limiting welfare rights under Equal Protection
Clause); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (restricting travel to Cuba); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (taking a broad view of clear and present
danger); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (allowing wartime
ancestry-based detention); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940) (holding unconstitutional to require student to salute flag), overruled by
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding state sterilization law and noting "[t]hree genera-
tions of imbeciles are enough"); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)
(creating a restrictive clear and present danger test); Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211 (1919) (limiting political speech rights); Schenk v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919) (limiting political speech protection); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905) (limiting state intervention in labor markets); Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896) (maintaining racial "separate but equal" education); Chae
Ching Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Cases), 130 U.S. 581 (1889)
(excluding alien workers permissible despite treaty); The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883) (taking a restrictive view of Fourteenth Amendment state
action); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (upholding gender-based denial
of occupation of attorney); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (minimiz-
ing Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause); Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (denying slaves citizenship and holding no con-
gressional power to limit vested property rights in slaves).
96. RONALD DWORKiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 148 (1977).
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It is easy to imagine persons of any recognizable political persua-
sion being ambivalent toward judicial review, on whatever subjects
are of greatest personal and political concern. To either endorse or
reject judicial review may seem to write off many personally dis-
turbing outcomes on important matters over the span of American
constitutional history.
This "mixed" or ambivalent view is not the only reasonable
view. Some people, given their established substantive value
commitments, may think well, and others less favorably, of one or
more forms of judicial review. More importantly, even if one finds
the historical track record of judicial review decidedly mixed, there
is no guarantee that such a pattern will endure into the future peri-
ods of time about which one most particularly cares. The next
decade or quarter of a century of judicial review may, from any
given political perspective, prove to be either an abomination or a
golden age.
V. WHY MIGHT JUDICIAL REVIEW INDEPENDENTLY MATTER?
It is not difficult to think of possible reasons to attach inde-
pendent moral weight to some form of judicial review or its ab-
sence. Typically, though, the problem is that it proves equally easy
to impeach, minimize, or bypass the possible arguments in some
plausible way. The moral and political values of particular results,
whether reached with or without judicial review, tend to outweigh
the net results of such arguments ultimately.
Not everyone has been persuaded that the institution of ju-
dicial review has provided much of a difference, one way or an-
other. Mark Tushnet, one of the leading progressive students of
judicial review, has concluded that "judicial review has been basi-
cally 'noise around zero,' a sort of random disruption of the results
achieved in the fora of nonjudicial politics." 97 Again, one can rea-
sonably reject this view, for some or all of the historical past and
even more clearly over any selected future period. Theorists have
covered a range of similar possible positions. Indeed, some
thoughtful writers have exercised restraint in their assessment of
the overall value or disvalue of judicial review. Thus, the philoso-
pher Peter Railton has concluded "the contribution of judicial re-
97. Mark Tushnet, Politics, National Identity, and the Thin Constitution,
34 U. RICH. L. REv. 545, 550 (2000).
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view to basic rights-or to liberal-democratic values generally-
has been on balance either slight or negative."98 Professor Railton
reasoned that any positive results in particular cases of judicial
review must be balanced against the costs of judicial review in
terms of loss of popular sovereignty, political equality, and democ-
racy. Following the work of Gerald Rosenberg,' °° writers, for
example Professor Tushnet,' °' have doubted whether even the
touted successes of judicial review have had as much favorable
impact in actual lived practice as is sometimes believed.'2
A. Judicial Review and Judicial Independence
The result that one reaches on the distinctive value of judi-
cial review should account for the specific purported virtues and
vices of judicial review. For example, it is often thought that Su-
preme Court Justices in particular, tend to enjoy, even more than
other legal decision-makers, some desirable form of "independ-
ence." In turn, presumptively this independence leads to desirable
judicial decisions.
Stated affirmatively, the general idea is that "U]udges are
more independent and more value-free than members of the politi-
cal branches."'' 3 With less assurance, judges "set themselves at
some distance from everyday politics; their special standing in a
democracy requires a certain detachment and thoughtfulness."' 4 In
the same vein, "Supreme Court justices [sic] are especially free to
exercise their judgment untainted by avarice or personal ambi-
98. Peter Railton, Judicial Review, Elites, and Liberal Democracy, in
NoMos XXV: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 153, 167 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1983).
99. See id.
100. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
101. See Tushnet, supra note 97; at fullest length, MARK TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
102. For a response to Professor Tushnet's use of Professor Rosenberg's
argument, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Faith?: America Without Judicial
Review, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1416, 1416, 1427-28 (2000).
103. Robert McKay, Judicial Review in a Liberal Democracy, in NOMOS
XXV: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 121, 138-39 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1983).
104. Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379,
388 (1981).
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tion."' '° A more skeptical leading critic of judicial review, Jeremy
Waldron, has observed that "[t]he thought seems to be that the
courts, with their wigs and ceremonies, heir leather bound vol-
umes, and their relative insulation from party politics"' 6 are, on
that doubtful basis, more to be trusted with basic civil and human
rights than are legislatures. 0 7
There is certainly some dispute, or at least a difference in
emphasis, among careful observers on the reality of meaningful
independence of federal judges, as distinguished from other gov-
ernmental officials. Seemingly, independence is presumed by
what is referred to as the attitudinal model of judicial decision-
making. The attitudinal model is said to hold "that the Supreme
Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-A-vis the
ideological attitudes and values of the justices. ' ' Yet, whether the
Justices' attitudes and values, including possible shifts therein,
reflect judicial independence is an open question.
Thus, some argue that Supreme Court Justices, along with
federal judges more generally, are influenced in various ways by
the mass media, '°9 by selected social groups, "0 and by the legal pro-
105. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
58 (2001); see also id. at 59 ("Judges are... disinterested.").
106. JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 5 (1999). For a
response emphasizing the partisan political insulation and competence screening
of federal judges, see Richard A. Posner, Review of Jeremy Waldron, Law and
Disagreement, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 582, 591 (2000).
107. See WALDRON, supra note 106, at 5. For recent statements of Profes-
sor Waldron's views, see Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judi-
cial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006); WALDRON, Law and Disagreement,
supra note 1, at 211-312 (1999).
108. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ArrTruDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002). For some attitudes and demo-
graphics of federal judges, see Amy E. Black & Stanley Rothman, Shall We Kill
All the Lawyers First?: Insider and Outsider Views of the Legal Profession, 21
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 835 (1998).
109. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A
PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 137, 139, 142 (2006).
110. See id. at 142, 151 (asserting that "[jiudges want the approval of indi-
viduals and groups that are salient to them, and their interest in approval may
affect their judicial behavior"). This sort of influence should, however, be dis-
tinguished from explicit lobbying. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of
Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1013, 1019,
1022 (2004).
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fession,"' as well as by the broader public and its anticipated reac-• 112
tions. Others argue that even Supreme Court Justices are aware
of their institutional context and of the preferences of other ac-
tors."3 Thus, it is certainly reasonable to think of Supreme Court
Justices as less than independent from various sorts of external
influences, and any attempt to compare the independence of the
Justices and of other federal political actors, including tenured civil
servants, would be even more contestable. Most crucially, it is
unclear to what degree the Supreme Court, even in the modem
era, " 4 could long be out of step significantly with the President and
Congress." 5
111. See BAUM, supra note 109, at 142.
112. See id. at 155 ("[J]ustices worry about the erosion of public support
for the Court."). At the extreme, consider, at least for some non-Supreme Court
judges, the reactions reported in Mike McKee, Judges on ABA Panel Describe
Living in Fear, Years After Unpopular Rulings, THE RECORDER, Aug. 13, 2007,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1186736531207. Whether
less concern for public reaction would count as (desirable) judicial independence
is unclear; often the vague idea of judicial independence is left unspecified. See
Sanford Levinson, Identifying "Independence," 86 B.U. L. REV. 1297, 1297
(2006).
113. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE xiii
(1998); see also HOWARD GILLMAN & CORNELL W. CLAYTON, Beyond Judicial
Attitudes: Institutional Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 1, 3
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) ("[T]here may be much to
be gained by focusing less on the policy preferences of particular justices and
more on the distinctive characteristics of the Court as an institution, its relation-
ship to other institutions in the political system, and how both of these might
shape judicial values and attitudes."). For discussion of a number of possibly
relevant considerations of various sorts, see RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING
LAW 135-44 (1995), in which the author models judicial utility in terms of ef-
fort or time devoted; on and off worksite leisure, including delegation; pecuniary
income; reputation; voting itself, including the utility derived from adhering to
certain constraints on voting; popularity; prestige; and the value of avoiding
reversal over time.
114. Consider the Supreme Court's apparent preference for discretion over
valor in Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 506 (1869), in which the Court
viewed its own jurisdiction rather modestly, in light of congressional hostility.
115. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 257, 310 & n.296 (2005) (noting the dependence of the federal courts on
the other branches (citing, for example, Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court
as a Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 583-85 (2001))).
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B. Judicial Review and Decision on Principle
The idea that the federal courts, and especially the Supreme
Court, do, or at least can, decide important matters on the basis not
of politics, but of principle, is related to the murky idea of judicial
independence.'16 While it is conceivable to begin with a politically
neutral understanding of how the Court might decide a matter on"principle,"" 7 the "neutral" ideal of "principle" will tend to slide
into something more like a well-considered, if not a politically de-
sirable or justifiable, principle."8
To defend judicial review as "principled" decision-making,
one of course will need to establish that the decision would be less
likely to rest on principle if Congress or the President makes it."9
One problem is that the other branches, like the Court, may act at
least partially on principle, in the sense of some allocation of the
rights in question. Most of the leading constitutional issues can be
expressed at least partially in terms of conflicting visions of
rights.' 20
Even if one assumes that the Court may rely more on prin-
ciple, in this limited sense of a concern for allocating rights, one
must still wonder how much this difference between the Court and
other branches will be worth. In this sense, "principle" could ac-
cord a trumping right to segregationists as well as to desegrega-
tionists, to those seeking abortion or gay marriage as well as to
those who seek their prohibition, to those favoring as well as op-
116. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 58 (2d ed., Yale Univ. Press
1986) (1962); DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 70 (1985) ("Judicial review insures
that the most fundamental issues of political morality will finally be set out and
debated as issues of principle and not political power alone ....").
117. See DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 69 (distinguishing matters of "princi-
ple," or of rights allocation, from matters of "policy," or of how to pursue the
general welfare).
118. See BICKEL, supra note 116, at 58 (noting that "principle" is based on"society's [long-term] spiritual as well as material needs").
119. DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 69-70. At a normative level, John Rawls
argued that Congress was no less bound than the Supreme Court to justify its
output in non-comprehensive public reason terms when matters of basic justice
and constitutional essentials are at stake. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
235 (Columbia Univ. Press expanded ed. 2005).
120. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
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posing capital punishment, and to both sides of every issue from
gun control to religion in the public schools.' 2' Why would the
Court's assumed special attention to recognizing or denying rights
in such cases, to one side or another, count as a significant practi-
cal advantage or disadvantage for judicial review?
At this point in the analysis, there is an expected slide from
a federal court's deciding cases merely on principle, or right, to
something like deciding cases on the basis of a good, sound, justi-
fied principle. It would be significant if one could show the Su-
preme Court to be either especially good or bad at deciding issues
on the basis of a well-justified principle. Yet, both advocates and
detractors of judicial review must come to terms with the well-
established and continuing track record of the Supreme Court.
However one defines a well-justified principle, the Court likely has
exhibited an attraction to that principle on many occasions,'22 al-
though it may be unclear whether the Court displays this attraction
more or less than other branches do. Unfortunately, the Court has
likewise disdained nearly everyone's preferred principle on any
number of other important occasions.'23
Decision-making merely on principle, then, naturally drifts
into a concern for decision based on well-justified principles and
then into matters of normative moral and political substance.
Thus, it remains more defensible that one's theory of judicial re-
view should be a secondary consideration. Furthermore, one's
strongest normative preferences on issues of moral and political
substance should be the driving force behind these secondary theo-
ries.
121. A number of these principles can be found on one or both sides of the
politically progressive/non-politically progressive divide between the Court's
decisions, as already discussed. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text,
depending on one's substantive normative preferences.
122. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
123. Correspondingly, depending upon one's normative preferences, see
supra note 94 or note 95. The more or less mixed results of judicial review lead
naturally to Judge Posner's explicit pragmatism, within which "whether judicial
review has been on balance a good thing for America" becomes the key ques-
tion. Richard A. Posner, Review of Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement,
100 COLUM. L. REv. 582, 592 (2000); Waldron, Judicial Review, supra note 1,
at 1405.
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C. Judicial Review, Protection of the Powerless, and Democracy
More specifically, people sometimes defend judicial review
substantively on the basis of the Court's distinctive protection
thereby of the "weak and powerless"'24 or of political minorities.
12 1
This may or may not reflect the constitutional drafters' inten-
tions. 16 Regardless of the original intent, it is unclear how well
any such intention has translated into practice through judicial re-
view, compared to the work of the other branches.' 27 The illustra-
tive record referred to above is often thought of as consistently
mixed.' 28 Given the possibilities of different decisions by Congress
and the President had judicial review never been established,129 the
case for or against judicial review based on distinctive protection
of any designated set of political minorities becomes even less
clear.
Nor does a focus on either the values or limitations of
majoritarian democracy provide independent grounds for or
against judicial review. It is often thought that judicial review is
anti-majoritarian, in the sense of sometimes overturning the results
of a democratic political process. 30 This would presumably be a
124. Robert B. McKay, Judicial Review in a Liberal Democracy, in
NOMOS XXV: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 121, 140 (1983).
125. David 0. Brink, Legal Theory, Legal interpretation, and Judicial
Review, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105, 136 (1988).
126. See id.
127. For an authoritative voice of skepticism as to the protection of minor-
ity rights through judicial review of federal legislation, see the leading scholar,
ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989). Here, Dahl questions
the Supreme Court's political independence as well as its historic commitment
to fundamental rights and interests. Id. at 189-90.
128. See supra notes 94-95 for contrasts.
129. For background, see JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, The Origin and Scope
of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, in LEGAL ESSAYS 24 (reprint
ed. 1972) (1908) (quoting Daniel Webster on legislators as sometimes voting for
a dubiously constitutional bill on grounds that judicial review will be available
to resolve such matters). For an expression of mixed judgment on this point, see
JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 66
(1983) (1980), in which the author argues the improbability of the counterfactual
outcomes. See also Perry, supra note 6, at 874.
130. The countermajoritarian problem has been raised most famously in
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), and the his-
tory and merits of this dispute have been examined, for example, in Barry
Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993); Barry
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moral cost of judicial review, to the extent that judicial review in-
volves a loss of valuable democratic functioning.
Many different and indeed opposing approaches to the
question of democracy are possible. 3' One of these is to think of
democracy more in substantive rather than procedural or electoral
terms. Thus, some think of democracy less in terms of majority
rule and more as a substantive matter of "the equal freedom and
independence"'132 of citizens.'33
Such approaches link judicial review to presumably goodthings but actually do little to establish the independent moral im-
portance of judicial review. To say that equal freedom1 4 is a good
thing is merely to set the stage for familiar ideological debates of
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part I: The Road
to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Ilya Somin, Political
Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the
Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1287 (2004). For
a sanguine view of the relation between judicial review and deliberative democ-
racy, see Horacio Spector, Judicial Review, Rights, and Democracy, 22 L. &
PHIL. 285, 286 (2003).
131. For a helpful survey of some basic arguments, see Jesse H. Choper,
The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Prac-
tice, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 810 (1974), discussing doubts about the majoritarian or
democratic character of much legislation and noting the potential for democratic
influences on the Supreme Court. For further nuances, see Dimitrios Kyritsis,
Representation and Waldron's Objection to Judicial Review, 26 Ox. J. LEGAL
STuD. 733, 740-41 (2006); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Populism: Is It
Time For 'We the People' To Demand an Article V Convention?, 4 WIDENER L.
SYMP. J. 211 (1999).
132. Samuel Freeman, Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of
Judicial Review, 9 L. & PHL. 327, 331 (1990).
133. For arguments similar to that of Freeman, see, for example,
EISGRUBER, supra note 105, at 58-59; Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, The Right to
Judicial Review, 92 VA. L. REV. 991 (2006) (arguing for a deontologically-based
democratic participatory right to a hearing for purposes of judicial review, but
on a logic compatible with systems far weaker than judicial supremacy or strong
judicial review); Alon Harel, Rights-Based Judicial Review: A Democratic
Justification, 22 L. & PHIL. 247 (2003) (arguing judicial review as compatible
with if not embodying a worthy alternative understanding of participatory de-
mocracy).
134. For background, but hardly an exhaustion of the range of ideological
possibilities, see the essays in EQUAL FREEDOM: SELECTED TANNER LECTURES
ON HUMAN VALUES (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995).
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the definition of equal freedom135 or what counts as the most valu-
able or legitimate kind of equal freedom 36 This level of debate
will largely settle whether judicial review is defined at least partly
as a good thing or not. Yet, defining judicial review partly in
terms of seeking good things, such as equal freedom and inde-
pendence, does not change historical or future realities. For most
mainstream definitions of equal freedom, it seems clear that judi-
cial review has sometimes promoted and sometimes undermined
such a value.'37 This broad pattern may well endure into the future.
It is inconceivable that any court could consistently issue decisions
that are "neutral" among conceptions of equal freedom or any sub-
stantive conception of democracy, let alone faithfully apply such a"neutral" idea in practice.'38
D. Judicial Review and the Value of Settlement
A more pragmatic approach argues for judicial review as
distinctively promoting less glamorous values such as uniformity,
finality, or settled resolution in the law. The courts, 9 as well as
135. By contrast with several of the essays contained in id., see, for exam-
ple, FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (paperpack ed. 1978)
(1960); LEFT LIBERTARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
(Peter Vallentyne & Hillel Steiner eds., 2001); DOUGLAS B. RASMUSSEN &
DOUGLAS J. DEN UYL, NORMS OF LIBERTY: A PERFECTIONIST BASIS FOR A
NON-PERFECTIONIST POLmCS (2005).
136. See Jeremy Waldron, Freeman's Defense of Judicial Review, 13 L. &
PHIL. 27, 32 (1994).
137. However, we usually conceive of equal freedom and independence,
or of any other substantive theory of democracy, the cases from any era noted
supra notes 94 and 95 will provide examples of at least minimally upholding, as
well as of neglecting, any such conception. In Mark Tushnet's concise observa-
tion, "we buy judicial review wholesale." MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 141 (1999).
138. Consider, for example, whether it would be possible even in theory to
issue an affirmative action decision that was neutral among competing theories
of what "equal liberty" meant and required. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny for racially-based affirma-
tive action).
139. Much of the driving force of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304
(1816), lies in the perceived need for uniform-and for nationally, as opposed to
parochially minded-interpretations of the Commerce Clause. See also Glass-
roth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1302-03 (1lth Cir. 2003) (holding a state su-
preme court judge, no less than state governor, bound by final judgment of state
or federal court) (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)).
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classic'4° and contemporary14 1 commentators, have endorsed this
general theme. The idea is that strong judicial review-judicial
supremacy, if not weaker forms of judicial review-provides an"ultimacy"' 41 in legal argument that is conducive to uniformity or
settledness in the law, at least short of constitutional amendment.
This sort of argument, however, is contestable at several
points. One might wonder how much settledness and finality the
Supreme Court has currently bestowed on the law of, for example,affirmative action, late-term abortions, voting districts, the death
penalty, the Establishment Clause, student speech, or commercial
speech. Historic examples plainly include a number of instances
of the dramatic upsetting of settled precedent. 43 The classic free
speech and free exercise case of West Virginia State Board of Edu-
cation v. Barnette'44 explicitly overturned a "settled" Supreme
Court decision that was not more than three years old, Minersville
140. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 130 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak reprint ed. 1987)
(1833) (For the sake of conclusiveness and uniformity, "a supreme arbiter or
authority" in constriing the Constitution is "if not absolutely indispensable, at
least, of the highest possible practical utility and importance."); Walter F. Mur-
phy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest For the Ultimate Constitutional Inter-
preter, 48 REv. POL. 401, 407 (1986) (quoting Justice Story).
141. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial
Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 466 (2000) ("[Olur argument
is that the Cooper [v. Aaron] rule is normatively superior to what we tenden-
tiously call institutional anarchy."); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1359, 1359
(1997) (arguing judicial supremacy permits the "settlement" of contested issues
as well as coordination of social behavior); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of
Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1013, 1014
(2004) (referring to "the essential, stabilizing effect of binding decisions by the
judicial branch"); Laurence H. Tribe, On Judicial Review: Laurence H. Tribe,
Jeremy Waldron, and Mark Tushnet Debate, DISSENT, Summer 2005, at 81, 81.
But see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REvIEw 234-35 (2004) (arguing degrees of"settledness" as complex empirical questions); TUSHNET, supra note 137, at 27-
28 (1999) (critiquing Alexander & Schauer, supra).
142. See Perry, supra note 6, at 869.
143. Compare the natural "pairs" between cases listed supra notes 94
and 95.
144. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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School District v. Gobitis,1 45 to the lasting credit of the Court.
Settledness may be fragile and in some cases perhaps, rightly so.
From the standpoint of a minority or majority, many settled
cases will remain settled incorrectly. People will reasonably wish
to factor the perpetuation of what they take to be a substantial and
continuing loss of moral or political value into account. Some
people will also attach only minimal, if not actually negative, value
to legal settledness. For example, Professor Seidman, while
endorsing judicial review,1 46 also stands the "settlement" argument
for judicial review on its head. He argues that "a constitution that
unsettles creates no permanent losers. By destabilizing whatever
outcomes are produced by the political process, it provides citizens
with a forum and a vocabulary they can use to continue the argu-
ment."14' 7  To Professor Seidman's view, some forms of non-
settledness may enhance political legitimacy and broaden com-
mitment.' 8 Of course, on such a theory, one must also factor in
any additional lack of settlement and resolution underlying the
favored but controversial precedents. Most people have little per-
suasive grounds for assuming that the 5-4 Supreme Court votes
that this article strongly endorses will be stable, while the 5-4 votes
that this article proscribes will prove unstable.
It seems clear as well that settledness and uniformity in the
law-to the degree the Supreme Court realistically provides
such-is available elsewhere. Even a federal administrative
agency might provide a single uniform voice in interpreting a stat-
ute where the courts would likely reach diverse results on the same
145. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). For a less enthusiastic assessment of what judi-
cial review has meant in free speech cases, see Robert F. Nagel, How Useful Is
Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 302, 340 (1984),
in which the author argues "the Court's program, taken as a whole, has done
great damage to the public understanding and appreciation of the principle of
free speech by making it seem trivial, foreign, and unnecessarily costly." How-
ever, as Professor Nagel recognizes, most will see this, if true, as a result of bad
decisions or bad opinions, rather than of judicial review itself or its absence. See
id.
146. See Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A
NEW DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 9 (2001).
147. Id. at 8. This function may of course be in some tension with other
constitutional functions.
148. See id. at 8-9.
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issue. 149 More plainly, despite partisan divides, Congress at least in
particular areas could provide as much authoritative finality, uni-
formity, and stability to the law as could the Supreme Court. For
example, consider the congressional adoption of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act'5° in response to the Court's arguably"unsettling," however otherwise justified, opinion in Employment
Division v. Smith. 5' The fact that the Supreme Court then pro-
ceeded to reassert its supremacy in the succeeding case of City of
Boerne v. Flores'52 hardly shows that the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act would not have otherwise settled the law."3 Strong ju-
dicial review thus offers no unique route to a particular degree of
settledness in the legal system.
VI. ANALOGY BETWEEN JUDICIAL REVIEW, FILIBUSTER,
AND ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE
At this point, it is natural to ask whether judicial review is
unique in inspiring critics, defenders, and ambivalent parties, while
in the end, it is of only modest normative import in itself. It is hard
to say whether judicial review is indeed unique in this respect, but
it may be most analogous to the value or disvalue, in itself, of the
senatorial filibuster.1 4 It is certainly possible to defend or con-
demn the filibuster simply in the abstract, as variously undermin-
149. For a general discussion, see Peter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases
Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources For
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987). For a dis-
cussion of doubts about entrusting increased constitutional interpretive authority
to the President, however, see Dale Carpenter, Judicial Supremacy and Its Dis-
contents, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 427 (2003), responding to Michael
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law
Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 223 (1994).
150. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4 (2000).
151. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
152. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (readopting a free exercise test arguably modi-
fied, rather than maintained, in Smith, 494 U.S. 872).
153. For discussion, see Robert F. Nagel, Judicial Supremacy and the
Settlement Function, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 849 (1998).
154. For historical and analytical studies, see SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN
S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE?: FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED STATES
SENATE (1997); GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER:
OBSTRUCTION AND LAWMAKING IN THE U.S. SENATE (2006); Catherine Fisk &
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181 (1997).
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ing or, more subtly, promoting values such as genuinely democ-
ratic rule.155
If the analogy to judicial review were to hold, the assess-
ments of the filibuster would likely vary with the perceived moral
merits of the most significant filibusters. This article need not take
a position on this issue. It is not unheard of, however, for one's
view of the merits of a filibuster to be strongly influenced by one's
view of the given situation, such as the 1960's civil rights legisla-
tion or the potential conservative Supreme Court and other judicial
nominees that might have been presented for Senate consideration
by President Bush.15
6
In fact, it was hardly rare for opponents of the Civil Rights-
era filibuster or other filibusters to later express more sympathy for
the judicial nominee filibuster or vice versa. 157 This is not to ac-
cuse anyone of hypocrisy.'58 The idea is merely to raise the possi-
bility that, as with judicial review, the substantive merits of the
filibuster subjects may genuinely matter more. Because judicial
review is ongoing, diffuse, and less frequently employed than are
filibusters, and because Court ideology tends to change haltingly
and gradually, one may simply see fewer periods in which sup-
porters and opponents of judicial review switch sides simultane-
ously. 59
Thus, the history and logic of the filibuster may shed light
on the idea of a principled, normative theory of judicial review.
Yet, if this is so, then someone may wonder whether judicial re-
view has gone too far. Perhaps logic would cut against trying to
155. See BINDER & SMITH supra note 154; WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra
note 154; Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 154.
156. This is not to say that in principle, the defensibility of filibustering a
bill and a presidential nomination to the Court should all else equal be the same;
two separate senatorial functions are involved.
157. For even shorter term switches, see, for example, David Boaz, Fili-
buster Flip-Flops, AM. SPECTATOR, Apr. 25, 2005, available at
http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pub-id=3745; Posting of Jan Crawford
Greenburg, When the Shoe Fits, http://blogs.abcnews.com/legalities/200 7 /07
(July 17, 2007, 17:02 PM EST).
158. One could argue, in good faith, that lifetime Supreme Court appoint-
ments are more important than any single civil rights statute, or the opposite, or
that the mechanisms of democratic politics and checks and balances operate
differently in various cases.
159. See Boaz, supra note 157; Greenburg, supra note 157.
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develop an independent, normative theory of any legal or political
institution that is typically charged with the deep intensity of parti-
san political or moral value commitment. Yet, this would go too
far and is not logically required in discussing judicial review.
Instead, suppose that the subject were to switch to some-
thing like the principle of equal voting rights or one person, one
vote in ordinary electoral politics.' 6 Now, it seems possible that
the same persons 16 at different times, depending upon whether the
political results in the various voting cases were deemed attractive
or unattractive, could endorse or reject not only the particular dis-
tricting arrangements but even the basic principle itself. In this
sense, one could favor or disfavor one person, one vote as an insti-
tutional arrangement, depending on the perceived resulting politi-
cal payoff.
However, it would be at least equally natural and sensible
to allow one's overall reaction to the general principle of one per-
son, one vote to be dominated not by that principle's payoffs in a
particular case but by the perceived moral quality of the general
principle itself. Thus, one could favor voting equality, or one per-
son, one vote, consistently on principled grounds, independent of
whether this principle leads to better moral and political outcomes
than another arrangement. For the average person, the virtue of
one person, one vote is its status as the only system consistent with
basic fairness, genuine community, equality of respect, and the
equal dignity of the person.162 This would not need to change after
even a long series of unattractive electoral results that might have
been avoidable under other voting systems. 63
160. For a constitutional discussion, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962), and the succeeding cases in its vein. For a discussion of contrary ap-
proaches, see,, for example, Richard W. Krouse, Two Concepts of Democratic
Representation, James and John Stuart Mill, 44 J. POL. 509 (1982).
161. For the rough analogy with regard to recent disputes over the filibus-
ter, see Boaz, supra note 157; Greenburg, supra note 157.
162. In particular, see Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C. § 1973-1973aa-6 (2003 & Supp. 2008), as discussed in, for example,
THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2006).
For background, see Terrye Conroy, The Voting Rights Act of 1965: A Selected
Annotated Bibliography, 98 L. LIBR. J. 663 (2006).
163. One might certainly blame supposedly bad electoral outcomes on
causes other than equal voting rights, such as on patterns of electoral spending.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1974). But our point stands even if we as-
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In sum, the claim that one should avoid principled, norma-
tive theorizing about judicial review as an independent value es-
capes two possible grounds for suspicion. One need not believe
that this claim is true only of judicial review but oddly of no other
well-recognized legal institution.'64 On the other hand, one need
not reach a similar conclusion with regard to all other well-
recognized legal institutions.'65 Reassuringly, in the respects this
article has examined, judicial review is special but not utterly
unique.
VII. CONCLUSION: How JUDICIAL REVIEW COULD FAIL TO
INDEPENDENTLY MATTER
It has been the main contention of this article that regard-
less of whether people have favorable, unfavorable, or mixed feel-
ings about judicial review, trying to develop some principled, nor-
mative theory of judicial review amounts to misspent effort. Cer-
tainly, it may well make sense within one's scheme of values to
care strongly about cases such as Brown v. Board of Education'
6 6
or Roe v. Wade167 or about some governmental outcome that was
never judicially reviewed. It also may make sense to try to sum-
marize one's reactions to many such cases, favorable or unfavor-
able, in a normative theory of some sort. This analysis could focus
mainly on the past, on the recent past, or else on the presumed
near-term or long-term future.
In the end, there should be little to one's normative view of
judicial review apart from one's substantive moral and political
reactions to how those cases came out and the ensuing conse-
quences. If the personally crucial cases had been decided differ-
ently, presumably one's normative theory of judicial review would
correspondingly be modified. One's more principled view, favor-
able or unfavorable, of judicial review in itself, apart from the po-
litical merits of crucial judicial outcomes, would amount mainly to
sume that equal voting rights itself is somehow inescapably responsible for un-
desired voting outcomes.
164. For a discussion of the filibuster, see supra notes 154-59 and accom-
panying text.
165. For a discussion of the equal voting rights, see supra notes 160-63
and accompanying text.
166. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
167. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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a mixture of guesswork, arbitrary preference and redefinition,
question-begging, and mere speculation.1 61 Most observers should
allow their best substantive normative assessments of crucial past
or future instances of judicial review to dominate their overall
normative assessment of judicial review, especially if the assumed
inherent virtues or vices of judicial review do not necessarily all
point in the same direction.
168. For example, see the illustrative claims and responses made for and
against various forms of judicial review, supra Part V. We shall, sensibly, as-
sume in contrast that someone could take a strong view for or against a number
of Supreme Court precedents without relying on this sort of arbitrariness,
guesswork, question-begging, or speculation, and on genuinely principled
grounds.
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